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Abstract
According to Bayesian orthodoxy, an agent should update—or at least should
plan to update—her credences by conditionalization. Some have defended this
claim by means of a diachronic Dutch book argument. They say: an agent who does
not plan to update her credences by conditionalization is vulnerable (by her own
lights) to a diachronic Dutch book, i.e., a sequence of bets which, when accepted,
guarantee loss of utility. Here, I show that this argument is in tension with evidence
externalism, i.e., the view that an agent’s evidence can entail non-trivial proposi-
tions about the external world. I argue that this tension casts doubt on the idea
that diachronic Dutch books can be used to justify or vindicate updating plans.
Some think that epistemic rationality consists in the instrumentally rational pursuit of
some kind of value. Call this view instrumentalism. Depending on what sort of value
we take to be relevant to epistemic rationality, instrumentalism can come in different
varieties. Some take the relevant kind of value to be distinctively epistemic, e.g., truth
or accuracy. Accuracy-first epistemology is an instance of this approach. Accuracy-firsters
think that norms of epistemic rationality can be justified (or vindicated) on the grounds
that violating them makes us vulnerable to sure or expected loss of accuracy.1 Others
think that the relevant kind of value need not be distinctively epistemic; it could be
the kind of pragmatic value that instrumentally rational agents promote when they
perform actions. Dutch book arguments are motivated by this thought. Defenders of
such arguments think that norms of epistemic rationality can be justified by appealing
to the fact that violating them makes us vulnerable to sure loss of utility.2 The aim of
this paper is to offer an argument, which, together with other arguments in the existing
literature, reveals a limitation of instrumentalism: instrumentalism makes undesirable
predictions about which updating plans are epistemically rational for us to adopt.
My starting point will be an updating plan that is commonly endorsed by Bayesians.
According to Bayesian orthodoxy, an agent should update, or should plan to update,
her credences by conditionalization. If an agent updates by conditionalization, then, in
situations of evidence-gathering where she gains new evidence without losing any ev-
1For instances of this approach, see Joyce (1998, 2009), Greaves and Wallace (2006), Leitgeb and Petti-
grew (2010a, 2010b), Pettigrew (2016), and Briggs and Pettigrew (2020).
2For arguments of this kind, see Ramsey (1926), de Finetti (1937), Lehman (1955) and Kemeny (1955),
Teller (1973), Skyrms (1987) and Lewis (1999).
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idence, her posterior credence in any proposition matches her prior conditional credence
in that proposition given her new evidence. We shall focus on:
Plan Conditionalization. If an agent is rationally certain that, in a scenario of
evidence-gathering, she might gain new evidence but won’t lose any evi-
dence, then she is required by epistemic rationality to plan to update her
credences by conditionalization in that scenario.
Some defend Plan Conditionalization by appealing to diachronic Dutch book arguments
(DDBA).3 A diachronic Dutch book is a system of bets which are offered at multiple
points of time and which, when accepted, result in sure utility loss. According to the
DDBA for Plan Conditionalization, if an agent does not plan by update by conditional-
ization, she is vulnerable (by her own lights) to a diachronic Dutch book.
The defenders of this DDBA presuppose that foreseeable exploitability indicates
irrationality, i.e., that, if an agent is rationally certain that complying with a certain
updating plan will make her vulnerable to sure loss of utility, then it is epistemically
irrational for her to adopt that plan. Here, I show that this assumption is in tensionwith
the combination of Plan Conditionalization and an attractive conception of evidence:
Evidence Externalism. An agent’s evidence is a proposition or a set of propo-
sitions that may entail non-trivial propositions about the external world.
The argument is this. If Evidence Externalism is true, we have to countenance cases
where an agent’s evidence before an inquiry leaves open either the possibility that her
future evidence will entail falsehoods, or that she will not have perfect access to her
future evidence. If the agent updates by conditionalization in such scenarios, she will
be subject to a fairly strong diachronic Dutch book. So, if foreseeable exploitability
indicates irrationality, then Plan Conditionalization is false.
This argument exposes a problem with instrumentalism. DDBAs and accuracy-
based arguments for Plan Conditionalization show that an agent is rationally required to
adopt the plan of updating by conditionalization under certain conditions, i.e., when
her evidence before an inquiry entails that her future evidence will only entail truths
and that she will have perfect access to her future evidence.4 A number of writers have
noticed that DDBAs and accuracy-based arguments do not support Plan Conditional-
3Lewis (1999) was the first proponent of this argument, though he wanted the argument to support
the simpler claim that an agent is required by epistemic rationality to update by conditionalization. Teller
(1973) reported Lewis’ argument, and van Fraassen (1984) explained why Lewis’ argument supports a
norm that requires the agent to commit to an updating plan rather than a norm that applies directly to
updating. Apart from these, there are other arguments for Plan Conditionalization. Williams (1980) uses the
Principle of Minimum Information to defend plan conditionalization. Van Fraassen (1999, 1989) appeals to
certain symmetry considerations to argue for it. More recently, Oddie (1997), Greaves and Wallace (2006),
Easwaran (2013), and Briggs and Pettigrew (2020) have offered accuracy-based arguments for it.
4For accuracy-based arguments for Plan Conditionalization, Oddie (1997) and Greaves and Wallace
(2006). Briggs and Pettigrew (2020) turn this into an accuracy-dominance argument for the diachronic
norm of updating by conditionalization.
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ization when some of these conditions are relaxed.5 What I show is that the tension
amongst Plan Conditionalization, Evidence Externalism and the assumption that foresee-
able exploitability indicates irrationality cannot easily be resolved by rejecting either
Evidence Externalism or Plan Conditionalization. This suggests that we should reject the
assumption that being foreseeably exploitable is always a mark of irrationality. As
Schoenfield’s (2017) work suggests, the same line of reasoning can be replicated for the
accuracy-first approach. This yields some evidence that we cannot justify (or vindicate)
updating plans by relying on instrumentalist approaches to epistemic rationality.
Here is how I shall proceed. After introducing some useful technical notions (§1),
I will show that there are two constraints—transparency and reflectiveness—that are in-
dividually necessary and jointly sufficient for an updating plan to be immune from a
diachronic Dutch book (§2). When an agent’s evidence entails that her future evidence
will only entail truths and that she will have perfect access to her future evidence, the
plan of updating by conditionalization is the only plan that is both transparent and
reflective by her own lights. In such circumstances, therefore, an agent can escape di-
achronic Dutch books by her own lights only by adopting that plan (§3). However,
I will argue that the defender of Evidence Externalism must countenance cases where,
by an agent’s own lights, the plan of updating by conditionalization fails to be either
transparent or reflective. In such cases, if the agent plans to update by conditionaliza-
tion, she will vulnerable, by her own lights, to diachronic Dutch books (§4). In the rest
of the paper, I will explain why this is bad news for defenders of DDBAs (§§5-7).6
1 Housekeeping
In this section, I will introduce a few useful technical notions.
1.1 Inquiries, Priors, and Plans
Let an inquiry be any evidence-gathering act where the agent’s evidence before the act
entails that she will engage in that act but will not lose any evidence while doing so.
We will represent any inquiry with a structure hW, Ei. W is a finite set of worlds that
5For this observation in relation to DDBAs, seeHild (1998a, 1998b), Bronfman (2014) andGallow (2019).
For this observation in relation to accuracy-based arguments, see Schoenfield (2017), Bronfman (2014) and
Das (2019), and Gallow (ming).
6I want to be clear about the scope of my argument. Some have expressed scepticism about the pro-
bative value of Dutch book arguments. For concerns of this sort about synchronic Dutch book arguments
for Probabilism (i.e., the norm of maintaining probabilistically coherent credences), see Christensen (1991)
and Pettigrew (2020). For responses, see Skyrms (1987), Christensen (1996), Mahtani (2015) and Petti-
grew (2020). It is controversial whether similar responses are available for diachronic Dutch books; for
discussion, see Briggs (2009) and Mahtani (2012). Here, I will only explore whether foreseeable dynamic
exploitability—which is exposed by diachronic Dutch books—can be used to support Plan Conditionaliza-
tion. So, my arguments leave open the possibility that some Dutch book arguments (e.g., synchronic ones)
can support epistemic norms like Probabilism.
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captures the agent’s evidence before the inquiry.7 E is an evidence function that maps
each world inW to a proposition (i.e., a set of worlds inW) which is the strongest piece
of posterior evidence that the agent receives in that world.
To fill out the picture a bit more, we will need the notion of a rational prior credence
function. I will assume that a rational prior credence function is a regular probability
function that maps any proposition to a real value.8 This reflects the degree of belief or
credence that the agent should have in that proposition before her inquiry.
This brings us to the third component of our formal framework: updating plans.
An updating plan is a plan that tells an agent how to respond to the evidence that she
receives. For any inquiry hW, Ei, it is natural to think of such a plan as a function U
from worlds in to credence functions, such that, for any two worlds w,w in W, if the
agent’s evidence in the two worlds is the same, thenU recommends the same credence
function in them. In other words, if E(w) = E(w), U(w) = U(w).9 To see how
the notion works, consider conditionalizing plans, i.e., updating plans that require the
agent to update by conditionalization. Relative to an inquiry hW, Ei and any rational
prior credence function p, an updating plan U is a conditionalizing plan just in case,
for any world w in W, U(w) = p(.jE(w)) (provided p(E(w)) > 0). It is easy to check
that conditionalizing plans are updating plans in the sense specified above: whenever
an agent’s evidence is the same in any two worlds in W, a conditionalizing plan will
recommend the same credence function in those two worlds.
1.2 Diachronic Dutch Books
Finally, I can introduce the last component of our formal framework: diachronic Dutch
books.
Let a bet be a gamble that yields a certain (positive or non-positive) payoff if a cer-
tain proposition is true, but nothing otherwise. The amount of utility that it pays is
the stake of the bet. A book is just a collection of bets G1,G2, ...,Gn on a set of propo-
sitions fP1, P2, ..., Png. Thus, we may think of a book B as a function from proposi-
tions to stakes: if a book B is a collection of bets G1,G2, ...,Gn on a set of propositions
fP1, P2, ..., Png, then B maps each Pi to the stake that the corresponding bet Gi has on
7The assumption that W is finite might seem a little artificial: it is natural to think that the sets of all
possible worlds that are compatible with an agent’s evidence ought to be uncountably infinite. However,
I take this to be a harmless idealization; with some additional constraints, all the results proved in this
paper can be generalized to inquiries that involve infinite sets of possible worlds.
8For any inquiry hW, Ei, a regular credence function p defined on the subsets ofW is one that assigns
non-zero credence to any singleton set containing a world in W. For defences of regularity as a gen-
eral constraint of epistemic rationality irrespective of the size of the possibility space, see Lewis (1980),
Skyrms (1980), and McGee (1994). For arguments against this general constraint, see Williamson (2007)
and Easwaran (2014). For my purposes, I only need a weaker requirement: namely, if an agent distributes
her credences over a finite set of possibilities, she shouldn’t assign non-zero credence to a possibility when
her evidence does not rule it out.
9This ensures that an updating plan does not require the agent to adopt different credence functions
even when her evidence does not vary. For discussion, see Greaves and Wallace (2006) and Schoenfield
(2017).
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that proposition.
We can calculate the payoff of a book B in any world w just by summing up the
stakes of those bets in B which are offered on propositions that are true in w. Sup-
pose B is a collection of three bets G1,G2 and G3 with stakes of s1, s2, and s3 on three
propositions P1, P2, and P3 respectively. If only P1 and P2 are true in w, then the payoff
of the book will just be the sum of s1 and s2. Let’s put this a bit more precisely. For
any inquiry hW, Ei, let v be a function such that for any w 2 W and any proposition
P  W, v(P,w) = 1 if w 2 P and v(P,w) = 0 if w /2 P. Then, if B is a book defined
on a set of propositions fP1, P2, ..., Png, then, for any w 2 W, the payoff of B in w is
payoff(B,w) =
n
å
i=1
B(Pi)v(Pi,w).
Next, I will assume that the maximum price that an agent can rationally pay for a
book is the weighted average of the stakes of the bets in that book, where the weight
for each bet is the credence that the agent assigns to the corresponding proposition.10
So, if B is a book defined on a set of propositions fP1, P2, ..., Png, then the maximum
price that an agent rationally pay for the book B relative to a credence function c is
price(B, c) =å
Pi
c(Pi)B(Pi).11
Using the notions of payoff and maximum price, we can define a notion of mini-
mum profit. The minimum profit that an agent can rationally make from a book in a
world is just the payoff of that book in that world minus the maximum price that she
can rationally pay for that book relative to her credence function. So, if B is a book
defined on a set of propositions fP1, P2, ..., Png, the minimum profit that an agent can
rationally make from B at a world w given her credence function c is profit(B, c,w) =
payoff(B,w)  price(B, c).
Using these three notions, we can finally state what a diachronic Dutch book is.
Suppose the strongest pieces of evidence that an agent could receive as a result of an
inquiry are E1, E2, ..., Ek. A diachronic Dutch book for an updating plan U is a series of
books B, B1, ..., Bk where (i) B is sold to an agent updating according to U at maximum
price before she gathers evidence, (ii) each Bi is sold to that agent at maximum price
when the strongest piece of future evidence she receives is Ei, and (iii) as a result, the
agent incurs guaranteed loss of utility. More precisely,
Diachronic Dutch Books. For any inquiry hW, Ei, let p be the relevant agent’s
rational prior credence function, and let E = fE(w) : w 2 Wg = fE1, E2, ..., Ekg
10Implicitly, I am making two assumptions. First, or any proposition P,if an agent has credence r in P,
she can rationally pay an amount no greater than r.s for a bet that has a stake of s on P. Second, for any
collection of bets G1,G2, ...,Gn, if the maximum price that an agent can rationally pay for each bet Gi is pi,
then the maximum price that the agent rationally pay for the entire collection is just the sum of the pi’s.
For discussion of the first principle, see Hedden (2013), Wron´ski and Godziszewski (2017) and Pettigrew
(ming). For discussion of the second principle, see Buchak (2013, Chapter 7).
11When the credence function c is a probability function, this will just be the expected payoff of the
book. In those cases, therefore, price(B, c) = å
w2W
c(w)payoff(B,w). However, when the agent is proba-
bilistically incoherent, the maximum price of the book needn’t be equivalent to its expected payoff.
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be the set of the strongest pieces of evidence that the agent could gain as a
result of her inquiry. An updating plan U defined on that inquiry is subject
to a diachronic Dutch book iff there exist books B, B1, ..., Bk, such that, for
any w 2 W, if E(w) = Ei, profit(B, p,w) + profit(Bi,U(w),w) < 0.
For our purposes, it will be useful to divide diachronic Dutch books into two kinds:
invariant and variant. In some cases where an agent’s updating plan is subject to a
diachronic Dutch book, she is offered different books after she has gathered evidence
depending on what her posterior evidence is. Let an invariant diachronic Dutch book
be a diachronic Dutch book where there is no such variation. Thus, an invariant di-
achronic Dutch book for an updating plan U simply consists of two books B1 and B2
where (i) B1 is sold to an agent updating according to U at maximum price before she
gathers evidence, (ii) B2 is sold to her at maximum price after she has gathered evi-
dence, and (iii) as a result, she incurs sure loss of utility. Let any diachronic Dutch book
that is not invariant be variant.
In the next section, I will explore the conditions under which updating plans are
subject to variant or invariant diachronic Dutch books.
2 Transparency and Reflectiveness
There are two conditions that are jointly necessary and sufficient for an updating plan
to be immune from variant or invariant diachronic Dutch books: transparency and re-
flectiveness.
Start with transparency. A transparent plan is a plan such that, if an agent complies
with it, she becomes certain about what evidence she has gained. For any inquiry
hW, Ei, let [E = P] be the proposition that the strongest evidence that the agent has
gained is P. So, it is just the set of worlds w where E(w) is P. If an agent complies with
a transparent plan, and the strongest posterior evidence that she has gained is P, then
her posterior credence function will assign credence of 1 to [E = P]. More precisely,
Transparency. For any inquiry hW, Ei, an updating plan U is transparent iff,
for any world w 2 W, if U(w) = c, then c([E = E(w)]) = 1.
Focus now on reflectiveness. This is best understood as an anti-bias constraint. A
biased inquiry is an inquiry which, by the agent’s own lights, is guaranteed to increase
or decrease her credence in a proposition. Suppose an agent starts out with a prior cre-
dence of 0.5 in a proposition P, but adopts a plan which, by lights of her prior evidence,
recommends the possible future credences of 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8 in P. In that scenario, the
agent has adopted a plan which, by her own lights, is guaranteed to increase her cre-
dence in P. Thus, her plan allows her to bias her inquiry in favour of P. Updating plans
that license such biased inquiry violate a really weak Reflection Principle. According to
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this principle, an agent’s prior credence in any proposition P should be a weighted av-
erage of her planned future credences in P (where the weights are probabilities). We’ll
call plans that satisfy this constraint reflective.
Reflectiveness. For any inquiry hW, Ei, let p be the relevant agent’s rational
prior credence function, and let E = fE(w) : w 2 Wg = fE1, E2, ..., Ekg be
the set of the strongest pieces of evidence that the agent could gain as a re-
sult of her inquiry. Let U be an updating plan defined on that inquiry, such
that Ui is the credence function recommended by U relative to Ei. Then, U
is reflective (relative to p) iff there exists a probability distribution p such
that, for any proposition P,
p(P) =
k
å
i=1
Ui(P)p([E = Ei]).12
To see how the notion of reflectiveness works, consider the case where the agent’s prior
credence in a proposition is 0.5, but her planned future credences in that very proposi-
tion are 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8. Since 0.5 cannot be expressed as a weighted average of 0.6, 0.7.
and 0.8 (provided that the weights are probabilities), the agent’s plan is not reflective.
Let an updating plan be probabilistic just in case it only recommends probability
functions relative to different bodies of evidence. There is a natural class of probabilistic
plans that are both transparent and reflective: the meta-conditionalizing plans. Relative
to an inquiry hW, Ei and a rational prior credence function p, an updating plan U is a
meta-conditionalizing plan just in case, for any world w, U(w) = p(.j[E = E(w)]). We
can show:
Proposition 1. Relative to an inquiry hW, Ei and any rational prior credence
function p, let U be a probabilistic updating plan defined on that inquiry.
Then, U is both transparent and reflective relative to p iff U is a meta-
conditionalizing plan relative to p.13
The difference between a conditionalizing plan and a meta-conditionalizing plan is
this. When the strongest evidence that an agent gains is Ei, the conditionalizing plan
12Skyrms (1987) calls reflectiveness the interior condition; for further discussion, see Pettigrew (2020, §8).
The constraint of reflectiveness needs to be distinguished from two other Reflection principles. The first is
similar to van Fraassen’s (1984) Reflection Principle. This principle says that an agent’s prior conditional
credence in P given that her future evidence is Ei should just be her planned future credence in P relative
to Ei, i.e., p(Pj[E = Ei]) = Ui(P). The other generalized version of van Fraassen’s principle is a bit
more complicated. It says that the agent’s prior credence in P should be her prior expectation of her
planned future credences in P, i.e., p(P) =
k
å
i=1
Ui(P)p([E = Ei]). The difference between the constraint of
reflectiveness and these two principles lies in this. If a plan is reflective, then, for any P, the agent’s prior
credence in P is a weighted average of her planned credences in P, but it doesn’t have to match her prior
expectation of her planned credences in P. Both van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle and the generalized
version of it impose the stronger requirement.
13All proofs are in the appendix.
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requires the agent to adopt as her posterior credence in any proposition P her prior con-
ditional credence in P given Ei. In contrast, in that scenario, a meta-conditionalizing
plan requires the agent to adopt as her posterior credence in P her prior conditional
credence in P given the proposition that the strongest evidence she has gained is Ei.
Therefore, in cases where Ei is not the same proposition as the proposition that the
strongest evidence that the agent has gained is Ei, the recommendations of conditional-
izing plans will come apart from the recommendations of meta-conditionalizing plans.
We are now in a position to prove a number of results about transparent and re-
flective plans. First, if a plan is not transparent, then it is subject to a variant diachronic
Dutch book, i.e., a diachronic Dutch book where the bookie offers different books de-
pending on the agent’s posterior evidence. Second, if an updating plan is not reflective,
then it is subject to an invariant diachronic Dutch book. Third, if a plan is both reflec-
tive and transparent, it is subject to no diachronic Dutch book whatsoever. Let’s state
these claims more carefully.
Proposition 2. For any inquiry hW, Ei and any rational prior credence func-
tion p, let U be a probabilistic updating plan defined on that inquiry. Then,
the following three claims are true.
• If U is not transparent, then U is subject to a variant diachronic Dutch
book.
• If U is not reflective relative to p, then U is subject to an invariant
diachronic Dutch book.
• If U is transparent and reflective relative to p, then U is not subject to
a (variant or invariant) diachronic Dutch book.
Some of these claims are parasitic on existing results. The first claim in Proposition
2 can be proved by adapting the Dutch book argument that Lewis (1999) and Teller
(1973) gave for conditionalization, while the third claim can be derived from Skyrms’
(1987) converse Dutch book theorem for conditionalization.14
Together, Propositions 1 and 2 imply:
Corollary 1. For any inquiry hW, Ei and any rational prior credence function
p, let U be a probabilistic updating plan defined on that inquiry. Then, U is
a meta-conditionalizing plan relative to p iffU is not subject to a diachronic
Dutch book.
14However, there are some differences between the proofs that these authors give and the proofs that I
give here (in the appendix). First, Lewis and Teller don’t distinguish transparency and reflectiveness. As
a result, they don’t distinguish the different kinds of diachronic Dutch books that failures of transparency
and failures of reflectiveness give rise to. My proof of Proposition 2 does that. Second, even though my
proof of the third claim makes use of the proof strategy underlying Skyrms’ (1987) converse Dutch book
theorem for conditionalization, I have tried to make clear how that strategy can be adapted for meta-
conditionalizing plans.
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The lesson: all and only meta-conditionalizing plans are able to escape diachronic
Dutch books. A version of Corollary 1 was proved by Hild (1998a).15 An accuracy-
based analogue of this corollary has been proved by Schoenfield (2017): namely, that
all and only meta-conditionalizing plans maximize expected accuracy.
3 The DDBA for Plan Conditionalization
Building on Corollary 1, we can offer a DDBA for Plan Conditionalization. The argument
requires two assumptions.
The first assumption is that, before any inquiry, an agent’s evidence should entail
that her future evidence will only entail truths, and that she will have perfect access to
whatever future evidence she has. This assumption, in turn, can be broken down into
three separate assumptions: Factivity, Positive Introspection, and Negative Introspection.
Factivity. In any inquiry, by lights of the agent’s prior evidence, if her pos-
terior evidence entails a proposition P, then P is true.
Positive Introspection. In any inquiry, by lights of the agent’s prior evidence,
if her posterior evidence entails a proposition P, then her posterior evidence
entails that her posterior evidence entails P.
Negative Introspection. In any inquiry, by lights of the agent’s prior evidence,
if her posterior evidence does not entail a proposition P, then her posterior
evidence entails that her posterior evidence does not entail P.
Factivity, Positive Introspection, and Negative Introspection correspond to the following
properties of inquiries: reflexivity, transitivity, and euclideanness. An inquiry hW, Ei
is reflexive just in case, for any w inW, w is in E(w). An inquiry hW, Ei is transitive just
in case, for any worlds w1,w2,w3 inW, if w2 is in E(w1) and w3 is in E(w2), then w3 is
in E(w1). Finally, an inquiry hW, Ei is euclidean just in case, for any worlds w1,w2,w3
in W, if w2 is in E(w1) and w3 is in E(w1), then w3 is in E(w2). When an inquiry has
all three of these properties, it is partitional: in such an inquiry, the evidence function E
imposes a partition onW where, for any world w, each E(w) is a cell containing all and
only those worlds in which the strongest piece of future evidence the agent receives is
E(w).
If Factivity is true, then all inquiries will be reflexive. Analogously, if Positive Intro-
spection is right, then all inquiries must be transitive. Finally, if Negative Introspection
is right, then all inquiries will be euclidean. So, if all three constraints are true, all
inquiries will be partitional. Our first assumption is:
15Hild’s proof strategy is different from mine. He proves Corollary 1 by showing that all and only meta-
conditionalizing plans, or plans that conform to what he calls auto-epistemic conditionalization, satisfy van
Fraassen’s (1984) Reflection Principle, and all and only plans that conform to this principle are immune
to diachronic Dutch books. However, he does not separately discuss two conditions that we discuss here:
reflectiveness and transparency.
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Partitional Evidence. Factivity, Positive Introspection, andNegative Introspection
are true.
Let’s proceed to our second assumption. Suppose an agent plans to update accord-
ing to a plan which, by her own lights, is subject to a diachronic Dutch book. So, she
can foresee that, if she complies with that plan, she will incur sure loss of utility. If
foreseeable exploitability of this kind indicates epistemic irrationality, then the agent is
not epistemically rational to adopt that plan. This yields:
Exploitability. For any inquiry hW, Ei, let U be an updating plan defined
on that inquiry. It is rationally permissible for the agent to adopt U before
her inquiry only if U is not subject to a diachronic Dutch book by her own
lights.
We are now in a position to offer our DDBA for Plan Conditionalization.
The argument depends on two facts. First, for any inquiry, all and only meta-
conditionalizing plans are immune to diachronic Dutch books. This follows from Corol-
lary 1. Second, if Partitional Evidence is true, then, in any inquiry where an agent does
not lose evidence but could gain evidence, all and only conditionalizing plans aremeta-
conditionalizing plans (by her lights). We establish this, by proving:
Proposition 3. Relative to an inquiry hW, Ei, let E = fE(w) : w 2 Wg be the
set of all the strongest pieces of evidence that an agent could gain. hW, Ei is
partitional iff, for any P 2 E , P = [E = P].
According to Proposition 3, in any partitional inquiry, conditionalizing on an evidence-
proposition P is the same as conditionalizing on the fact that P is the strongest evidence
one has received. So, whenever an inquiry is partitional, then, relative to it, a plan is
conditionalizing if and only if it is meta-conditionalizing.
These two facts yield the conclusion that, if Partitional Evidence is true, then, in
any inquiry where the agent does not lose evidence but could gain evidence, all and
only conditionalizing plans are immune from diachronic Dutchbooks. Given our first
assumption, i.e., Partitional Evidence, we can now conclude that in any scenario where
an agent is certain that she will gain evidence without losing any evidence, all and
only conditionalizing plans are immune from diachronic Dutchbooks. By Exploitability,
then, it follows that an agent is rationally permitted only to adopt conditionalizing
plans. This is the DDBA for Plan Conditionalization.
4 Externalism, Exploitability, and Conditionalization
This argument depends crucially on Partitional Evidence: if Partitional Evidence fails, it
is possible to construct diachronic Dutch books for conditionalizing plans.16 In fact,
using Corollary 1 and Proposition 3, we can prove:
16For this observation, Hild (1998b), Williamson (2000, §10.6), Bronfman (2014), and Gallow (2019).
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Corollary 2. For any inquiry hW, Ei and any rational prior credence function
p, let U be a conditionalizing plan defined on that inquiry relative to p. If
hW, Ei is non-partitional, then U is subject to a diachronic Dutch book.
In other words, when Partitional Evidence fails, an agent who complies with a condi-
tionalizing plan will be vulnerable to a diachronic Dutch book. If such Dutch books are
irrationality-indicating, then Plan Conditionalizationmay not be true after all. In the rest
of this section, I will show that, if Evidence Externalism is true, then Partitional Evidence
will indeed fail, and will make conditionalizing plans vulnerable to diachronic Dutch
books.
4.1 Externalism and Partitional Evidence
The evidence externalist is committed to two claims. The first is the claim that an
agent’s evidence is either a proposition or a set of propositions. The second is the claim
that this proposition or set of propositions entails non-trivial propositions not only
about the agent’s non-factive mental states (e.g., her phenomenal states) but also about
the external world. Typically, evidence externalists take factive mental states, e.g., my
seeing that there’s a hand before me, to be sources of conclusive evidence about states
of the external world.
My claim is this: if Evidence Externalism is true, then we must either reject Factivity
or Negative Introspection. This is because our mechanisms for gathering evidence about
the external world are fallible: sometimes, they give us false information without giv-
ing us any clue that this has happened. A wall may look red to me, even though it
is white and lit up with trick red lighting that will make any surface look red. If my
evidence before an inquiry does not rule out the possibility that I might find myself in
such a scenario as a result of my inquiry, then both Factivity and Negative Introspection
cannot be true. To see why, let’s extend this example. Suppose Evidence Externalism is
true, and I know all the relevant epistemological facts. Now, consider:
Red Wall. I am about to enter a room where I will face a wall. I have a
rational credence of 0.99 that the wall will be red. My evidence entails that,
if the wall is red, I will see that the wall is red. But I cannot rule out—and
assign a rational credence of 0.01 to—the possibility that the wall will be
white but lit up with red light. My evidence entails that, if that happens,
the wall will look red to me.
Here, I assign non-zero credence to the possibility that the wall is white but lit up with
red light. If Factivity is true, then, by lights of my prior evidence, my future evidence
only entails truths. So, in that scenario, my future evidence will not entail that the wall
is red. But, in that scenario, since the wall looks red to me and I have no reason to
suspect that anything is amiss, I will not be able to rule out the possibility that I see
that the wall is red. If (by my own lights) seeing that the wall is red suffices for me to
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have conclusive evidence for the claim that the wall is red, then my future evidence in
that scenario will not rule out the possibility that my future evidence entails that the
wall is red. So, Negative Introspectionwill fail.
The argument, more generally, is this. Suppose, before an inquiry, the agent antic-
ipates that, in the course of that inquiry, she will gain a piece of evidence that entails
a non-trivial proposition P about the external world. We can create a similar inquiry
where the agent not only anticipates being in that scenario, but also cannot rule out the
possibility of being in a phenomenally indistinguishable scenario in which P is false
but she gains the same information from the same source of information without hav-
ing any clue that P is false. In this latter possibility, the agent will not be able to rule
out the possibility that her evidence entails P. So, if Factivity is true, then the agent’s
evidence will not entail P in such a scenario, but also will not entail that it does not
entail P. Thus, Negative Introspection will be false. With respect to cases of this sort,
therefore, we must either reject Factivity or Negative Introspection.
An evidence externalist need not reject Positive Introspection.17 Moreover, even if
she does, she may acknowledge that, in cases like Red Wall, our inquiries will often
satisfy this constraint. Here, I shall be concerned with such cases.
4.2 Consequences
Suppose Factivity fails in Red Wall. Then, after I enter the room, if I face a white wall
lit up with red light, my evidence will entail that the wall is red. Let’s represent this
inquiry using the simple structure hW, Ei, where W contains just two worlds r and
w: r is the world where the wall is red, and w the world where the wall is white. In
any world in W, the strongest evidence I will gain is that the wall is red. Call this
proposition Red, i.e., the singleton set containing the world r. So, E(r) = E(w) = Red.
We can depict this structure with the following diagram.
r w
Figure 1: A Failure of Factivity in Red Wall
If p is my rational prior credence function before entering the room, my prior credence
in Red will be p(Red) = 0.99. If I update by conditionalizing on Red, then my posterior
credence in Red should be p(RedjRed) = 1. Since my posterior credence in Red is
17The evidence externalist could reject Positive Introspection. If we think that a piece of information
can have the status of evidence only if it is safely or reliably acquired from some information-gathering
mechanism, then we can run Williamson’s (2000, ch. 5) anti-KK argument against Positive Introspection.
The basic premise will be that even if an agent safely acquires a piece of information, she may not be able
to safely determine that it is safely acquired, so she may not have evidence that that piece of information
has the status of evidence. However, Williamson’s anti-KK argument depends on the assumption that an
agent can know certain controversial margin-for-error principles. This assumption has been rejected by
others such as Greco (2014), Stalnaker (2015), and Das and Salow (2018).
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uniformly higher than my prior credence in both r and w, the conditionalizing plan
will not be reflective in this case.
Suppose I commit myself to this plan. Then, by my own lights, I will be vulnerable
to an invariant diachronic Dutch book. To see this, consider two books Bold and Bnew
defined on fRed, Redg, such that Bold is sold to me at maximum price before I enter
the room, and Bnew is sold to me at maximum price after I enter the room irrespective
of the wall’s colour. The payoffs of these books are given in Table 1.
Red  Red
Bold 0 1
Bnew 0 -1
Table 1: Payoffs of Bold and Bnew
Since, before I enter the room, my credence in  Red is 0.01, the maximum price I can
rationally pay for Bold is 0.01 1 = 0.01. Suppose I pay this. But then, after I enter the
room, my credence in  Red drops to 0. So, the maximum price I’d be rational to pay
for Bnew is  1 0 = 0. So, I will rationally accept the bet by paying nothing. But note
that, if I accept both books, the net payoff in both r and wwill be 0. Thus, in both cases,
I will lose 0.01.
Suppose Factivity is true in Red Wall. This situation can be represented as follows.
r w
Figure 2: A Failure of Negative Introspection in Red Wall
Here, Negative Introspection fails: even though my future evidence in r entails Red, my
evidence in w does not. In fact, E(w) = fr,wg. So, if I update by conditionalization, my
posterior credence in Red in r will rise to 1, but, in w, it will match my prior credence
in Red. In this case, the conditionalizing plan will be reflective. But it will not be
transparent. For, in w, even though the strongest evidence I gain is fr,wg, I will not be
certain that the strongest evidence I have gained is fr,wg. I will be highly confident
that the strongest evidence I have gained is Red.
Suppose I commit myself to this conditionalizing plan. Then, by my own lights, I
will be vulnerable to a variant diachronic Dutch book. Suppose Bold is a book that is
sold to me at maximum price before I enter the room. Suppose Br is a book that is sold
to me at maximum price after I enter the room in r, and Bw is a book that is sold to me
at maximum price after I enter the room in w. The payoffs of these books are given in
Table 2.
Table 2: Payoffs of Bold, Br and Bw
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Red  Red
Bold 1 1.99
Br 0 0
Bw 0 -1
The maximum price I can rationally pay for Bold is 0.99 1+ 0.01 (1.99) = 0.99+
0.0199 = 1.0099. In r, since I am certain in Red, the maximum price I can rationally pay
for Br is 0. So, in r, the net profit I can make from buying both these books at maximum
price is 1  1.0099 =  0.0099. But things are different inw. Sincemy posterior credence
in  Red is 0.01 in w, the maximum price I can rationally pay for Bw is (0.01 ( 1)) =
 0.01. But the net profit I will make from accepting both books will be 1.99  1.0099 
1  ( 0.01) = 1  1.0099 =  0.0099. So, I will lose  0.0099 no matter what happens.
The upshot is this. If we hold Positive Introspection fixed in a case like Red Wall, then
a failure of either Factivity or Negative Introspection exposes conditionalizing plans to
diachronic Dutch books.
4.3 A Diagnosis
We can generalize this observation.
Suppose we are evidence externalists, and want to reject Factivity instead of Nega-
tive Introspection in cases like Red Wall. Then, we can set up an inquiry, where the agent
has both positive and negative introspective access to her posterior evidence but her
posterior evidence entails falsehoods. In many such cases, an agent’s inquiry will sat-
isfy a constraint called seriality: an inquiry hW, Ei is serial just in case, for any world w
inW, there exists some w in E(w). Seriality rules out the possibility that the strongest
evidence that an agent gains in an inquiry contradicts the evidence she earlier had. If
Factivity fails, then an agent can sometimes, but not always, gain such evidence. So, an
agent’s inquiry will often satisfy seriality. Here, we can show:
Proposition 4. For any serial, transitive, and euclidean inquiry hW, Ei, let U
be a conditionalizing plan defined on that inquiry relative to any rational
prior credence function p. Then, the following two claims are equivalent.
• hW, Ei is reflexive.
• U is reflective relative to p.
This shows the following. Suppose, for some inquiry, an agent adopts a condition-
alizing plan. Then, if the agent has perfect introspective access to her own posterior
evidence in that inquiry and the inquiry satisfies seriality, failures of Factivity in that
inquiry will be necessary and sufficient for the plan to be non-reflective. Proposition
2 predicts that complying with such a plan will expose the agent to an invariant di-
achronic Dutch book. This explains why I am vulnerable to an invariant diachronic
Dutch book in the version of Red Wallwhere Factivity fails.
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Suppose we are evidence externalists, but wewant to preserve Factivity by rejecting
Negative Introspection in cases like Red Wall. We can show the following.
Proposition 5. For any inquiry hW, Ei, let U be a conditionalizing plan de-
fined on hW, Ei relative to a rational prior credence function p. Then, the
following two claims are equivalent.
• hW, Ei is transitive and euclidean.
• U is transparent.
What does this imply? Suppose, for some inquiry, an agent adopts a conditionalizing
plan. Then, failures of either Positive or Negative Introspection in that inquiry will be
necessary and sufficient for the plan to be non-transparent. Proposition 2 predicts that
complying with such a plan will expose the agent to a variant diachronic Dutch book.
These results show that there is a tension amongst Plan Conditionalization, Evidence
Externalism, and Exploitability. As we have seen, an evidence externalist should reject
either Factivity or Negative Introspection, and sometimes perhaps even Positive Introspec-
tion. According to Proposition 4, if Positive andNegative Introspection are held fixed, then
failures of Factivity (in serial inquiries) make room for invariant diachronic Dutch books
for conditionalizing plans. According to Proposition 5, failures of Positive and Negative
Introspection expose to conditionalizing plans to variant diachronic Dutch books. So,
if Exploitability is true, then Evidence Externalism and Plan Conditionalization cannot be
true together.
In what follows, I argue that this tension can only be resolved by giving up the idea
that updating plans can be justified (or vindicated) by appealing to diachronic Dutch
books.
5 Strategy 1: Weakening Exploitability
In response to the tension amongst Plan Conditionalization, Evidence Externalism, and
Exploitability, one might claim that the fault lies not with Evidence Externalism or Plan
Conditionalization, but rather with Exploitability. But, in order to reject Exploitability, one
does not have to concede that foreseeable exploitability never indicates irrationality.
One only has to show that susceptibility to certain kinds of diachronic Dutch books
doesn’t indicate irrationality.
Let me explain. In the last section, I pointed out that, if Negative Introspection fails
in Red Wall, then the conditionalizing plan will be non-transparent, and therefore will
be subject to a variant diachronic Dutch book. But variant diachronic Dutch books
that exploit such non-transparency suffer from a flaw: they involve offering the agent
different books depending on her evidence. In Red Wall, for example, I am offered Br
in the world r where the wall is red, and Bw in the world w where the wall is white.
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Why is this a problem? First, an agent’s vulnerability to a diachronic Dutch book
only indicates the irrationality of her updating plan when she is foreseeably exploitable,
i.e., if she can see the Dutch book coming but can still be made to lose utility. Suppose
I foresee that the bookie will offer me Br when I am in r and Bw when I am in w. But
when she does offer me Bw when I am in w, this will give me information about my
epistemic situation. Since I have reason to think that I am in r, I will expect to be
offered Br. So, when I am offered Bw, this will give me evidence that I am in w. Then,
if I conditionalize on that evidence, I will just turn down the offer.
Second, if the bookie is to offer me these books depending on my evidence, she
must have information about what evidence I have. But in this case, I do not have
access to my own evidence. If the bookie does have more information about my evi-
dence than I do, the bookie will have some epistemic advantage over me, and therefore
will be able to exploit my lack of information about my evidential situation. But, one
might argue (as Lewis 1999 does), a diachronic Dutch book that exploits the agent’s
lack of information in this way cannot indicate her irrationality. This implies that vari-
ant diachronic Dutch books that exploit the non-transparency of updating plans cannot
indicate irrationality.
For these reasons, we might think that the variant diachronic Dutch book that we
used to exploit the non-transparency of my conditionalizing plan does not indicate the
irrationality of that updating plan. Accordingly, we might want to weaken Exploitabil-
ity while holding on to the idea that some diachronic Dutch books can indicate the
irrationality of updating plans. So, consider the following constraint.
Invariant Exploitability. For any inquiry hW, Ei, let U be an updating plan
defined on that inquiry. It is rationally permissible for the agent to adopt U
before her inquiry only if U is not subject to an invariant diachronic Dutch
book.
Modifying Exploitability does not help: even if we adopt Invariant Exploitability, we can
easily show that conditionalizing plans in cases like Red Wallmay still be subject to an
invariant diachronic Dutch book.
Consider a modified version of the variant diachronic Dutch book from §4.2. This
consists of two books Bold and Bw defined on fRed, Redg (instead of three), such that
Bold is sold to me at maximum price before I enter the room, and Bw is sold to me at
maximum price after I enter the room irrespective of the colour of the wall. The payoffs of
these books are given in Table 3.
Red  Red
Bold 1 1.99
Bw 0 -1
Table 3: Payoffs of Bold and Bw
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Once again, themaximumprice I can rationally pay for Bold is 0.99 1+ 0.01 (1.99) =
0.99+ 0.0199 = 1.0099. In r, since I am certain in Red, the maximum price I can ratio-
nally pay for Bw is 0. So, in r, the net profit I can make from buying both these books at
maximum price is 1  1.0099 =  0.0099. Since my posterior credence in  Red is 0.01
in w, the maximum price I can rationally pay for Bw is (0.01 ( 1)) =  0.01. But the
net profit I will make from accepting both books will be 1.99  1.0099  1  ( 0.01) =
1  1.0099 =  0.0099. So, I will lose 0.0099 no matter what happens. This is an invari-
ant diachronic Dutch book.
This observation generalizes.
Proposition 6. For any reflexive and transitive inquiry hW, Ei, let U be a
conditionalizing plan defined on hW, Ei relative to a rational prior credence
function p. Then, the following two claims are equivalent.
• hW, Ei is euclidean.
• U is not subject to an invariant diachronic Dutch book.
The upshot: when both Factivity and Positive Introspection are true but Negative Intro-
spection fails, complying with a conditionalizing plan will make an agent vulnerable to
an invariant diachronic Dutch book.
According to Proposition 4, if Positive and Negative Introspection are held fixed, then
failures of Negative Introspection (in serial inquiries) expose to conditionalizing plans to
invariant diachronic Dutch books. According to Proposition 6, if Factivity and Positive
Introspection are held fixed, then failures ofNegative Introspectionmake conditionalizing
plans vulnerable to invariant diachronic Dutch books. This shows us that, if Invari-
ant Exploitability is true, Evidence Externalism and Plan Conditionalization cannot be true
together.
6 Strategy 2: Rejecting Externalism
Here is a tempting thought. Since Evidence Externalism is partly responsible for the ten-
sion between Factivity and Negative Introspection, rejecting it might allow us to justify
Plan Conditionalization by appealing to diachronic Dutch books. For instance, a Carte-
sian conception of evidence—on which an agent’s evidence only entails propositions
about her phenomenal states—could help here. On some versions of this view, our
evidence consists of facts we know or are in a position to know by introspection about
our phenomenal states. And, arguably, if we do not know something by introspection,
we know or are in a position to know that we do not know it. So, these versions of the
Cartesian view may preserve both Factivity and Negative Introspection.
However, such a Cartesian view will face two challenges. First, it is not obvious
that the conflict between Factivity and Negative Introspection can be avoided on this
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view. For it is not clear that, whenever we fail to know a proposition P about our phe-
nomenal states, we also know (or are in a position to know) that we do not know P.
Consider someone who expects to be burnt by hot water. So, when she places her hand
under ice-cold water, she may falsely judge for a moment that she is undergoing a hot
sensation. At that time, she does not know that she is undergoing a hot sensation. But,
since she judges that she is undergoing a hot sensation, she may take herself to know
this, and thus may not be in a position to know that she does not know that she is un-
dergoing a hot sensation. According to the Cartesian view we are considering, in this
case, the agent’s evidence does not entail that she is undergoing a hot sensation, but her
evidence also does not entail that her evidence does not entail it. So, Negative Introspec-
tion fails. In such cases, conditionalizing plans will be subject to invariant diachronic
Dutch books.
Second, if a Cartesian view is combined with the idea that we should update by
conditionalization, we get sceptical consequences.18 Imagine an infant who is under-
going her first experiences. If she undergoes a veridical perceptual experience as of
there being a hand before her, is it rational for her to be confident that there is a ma-
terial object of that shape before her? It seems so. But if the Cartesian view is correct,
our evidence is exhausted by facts solely about our phenomenal states. If we are re-
quired by rationality to update by conditionalization, the infant can only be rationally
confident in the proposition M that there’s a material object of a certain shape before
her if her prior conditional credence in M given her evidence E is much higher than
her prior conditional credence in  M given her evidence E. This means that her prior
credence function must assign a much higher credence to M \ E than to  M \ E. In
other words, the agent must assign very low prior credence to sceptical hypotheses on
which, even though a material object of a certain hand-like shape appears to her, there
is not an object of that shape before her. But since the agent has no prior empirical
evidence at this point, she can only assign such low credence to sceptical hypotheses if
she has a priori reasons for doing so. But it is unclear if we could have a priori reasons
for discounting contingent sceptical hypotheses.19 If we cannot have such reasons, the
Cartesian view leads to scepticism.
7 Strategy 3: Rejecting Plan Conditionalization
Given that rejecting Evidence Externalism does not help us defend Plan Conditionalization
using DDBAs, we may reject Plan Conditionalization. If conditionalizing plans are not
rational for us to adopt, which plans are? The answer, I argue, is not obvious.
18See Neta (2009) for this argument.
19White (2006) accepts the view that we can have a priori reasons for discounting sceptical possibili-
ties. This commits him to a really strong form of rationalism. Wright (2004) avoids this by claiming that
we are entitled to dismiss sceptical possibilities without evidence. This compels him to reject a widely
accepted evidentialist conception of epistemic rationality on which we can be rational to believe certain
propositions only if we have sufficient evidence for them. Both these views are costly in their own ways.
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7.1 Failures of Factivity
Start with a version of Red Wall, where Positive and Negative Introspection hold and
therefore Factivity fails. In the world r where the wall is red and in the world w where
the wall is white but lit up with red light, my posterior evidence entails Red (i.e., the
proposition that the wall is red). If I update by conditionalizing, my credence in Red
should rise to 1. This would make the conditionalizing plan non-reflective. So, I will
be subject to an invariant diachronic Dutch book (according to Proposition 4). What’s
the way out?
I can avoid this Dutch book only if I do not change my prior credence in Red after I
have received the new evidence. This is precisely the advice that meta-conditionalizing
plans give me. If I comply with a meta-conditionalizing plan here, I will not be con-
ditionalizing on Red, but rather on [E = Red], i.e., the proposition that the strongest
evidence I’ve gained is W. This is just W. But if I conditionalize on W, my prior cre-
dence in Red will remain fixed at 0.99 even when my posterior evidence entails Red.
This way of updating my credences conflicts with:
The Entailment-Support Principle. If an agent’s evidence entails P, then her
evidence conclusively supports P.
In both the scenario where the wall is red and the scenario where it is white but lit up
with red light, my evidence entails Red. So, according to the Entailment-Support Prin-
ciple, my evidence conclusively supports Red. Plausibly, epistemic rationality requires
me to be certain in whatever my evidence conclusively supports.20 But this is not the
advice that meta-conditionalizing plans give us.
We might try to block this argument by rejecting the Entailment-Support Principle.
Here are two different kinds of counterexamples. If I see that there’s a hawk on the
fence post, my evidence (on an externalist picture) may include that information. But
suppose I am rationally unsure about whether I really see this: perhaps, hawks are
extremely rare in this region, so I cannot believe my eyes! So, I am rationally uncer-
tain about what my evidence is. In such a case, one might think, I cannot be rationally
20One might dispute this idea. But here are two counterarguments. First of all, there is an obvious
evidentialist rationale for thinking this. Plausibly, in a finite possibility spaces, an agent’s rational cre-
dences should match the degrees of evidential support that various propositions enjoy. Therefore, under
those circumstances, a proposition deserves non-zero credence only if it enjoys some positive degree of
evidential support. But if a proposition P is conclusively supported by an agent’s evidence, then  P gets
no positive degree of evidential support. So, it deserves zero credence. Second, there’s a sense in which
an agent who violates this principle adopts a set of credences that is both accuracy-wise and practically
suboptimal by her own lights. For example, in Red Wall, if I assign 0.99 to Red and 0.01 credence to  Red
even whenmy evidence conclusively entails Red, my credence function is accuracy-dominated (according
to any plausible measure of accuracy) by another credence function that assigns 1 to Red and 0 to  Red
relative to the set of worlds that her own evidence does not rule out. Similarly, if I assign 0.01 credence to
 Red even when my evidence entails Red, then a bookie can sell me at maximum price (of 0.01) a bet that
pays 1 unit of utility when  Red is true and nothing else otherwise, and subject me to sure loss of utility
by lights of my evidence. If we think that an agent should adopt credence functions that are accuracy-wise
or practically optimal by lights of her evidence, then, in this case, I should indeed be certain in what my
evidence conclusively supports.
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certain that there’s a hawk on the fence post. Similarly, consider a case where I have
competently deduced a conclusion from a set of premises, but I have received mis-
leading evidence for thinking that my capacity for deductive reasoning is impaired
in some way. Perhaps, I have discovered that I was slipped a reason-distorting drug
that is effective in 90 per cent of the cases. But, luckily, unbeknownst to me, it hasn’t
worked in this case. Here, I might not be uncertain about what my evidence is, but
rather about my capacity for assessing the evidence. One might think that, in such a
case, even though my evidence may entail that the conclusion I have drawn (assuming
that the premises are entailed by my evidence), I cannot be rationally certain in the
conclusion.21 Such cases strongly suggest that the Entailment-Support Principle is false.
I have two responses. First, even if these judgements about these cases are correct,
it seems clear that Red Wall is not a case of either of these kinds. In the version of Red
Wall where Factivity fails, when my evidence comes to entail Red, my evidence entails
that it entails Red, it entails that it entails that it entails Red, and so on. Thus, I have
perfect access to what my evidence entails. But I lack that kind of access in the example
of the hawk on the fence post. Moreover, I may also have no reason for thinking that
my capacity for reasoning (or, generally, for rationally assessing what my evidence
entails) is impaired in any way. But I have such evidence in the second case involving
competent deduction. What this shows that, even if the unqualified Entailment-Support
Principle is false, a qualified version of the principle (which sets aside cases of these two
kinds) will remain plausible. That will be enough for our purposes.
Here’s my second response. If we reject all (qualified or unqualified) versions of the
Entailment-Support Principle in a case like RedWall, we end upwith a form of scepticism.
Suppose we reject the Entailment-Support Principle by accepting ameta-conditionalizing
plan, or, more generally, an updating plan that requires us not to raise our credence
in Red in Red Wall. Such a plan will be sceptic-friendly: it will recommend that we
not raise our credence in a proposition about the external world whenever we assign
non-zero credence to a sceptical possibility where, unbeknownst to us, we are misled
about that proposition. If we accept Evidence Externalism in order to avoid external
world scepticism, it will be counterproductive for us to accept such a plan. For, by
the reasoning discussed in the last section, if we were to comply with such a plan, we
would never justifiably believe anything about the external world.
7.2 Failures of Negative Introspection
Next, consider the version of Red Wall where Factivity is true but Negative Introspection
fails. Given that Factivity is true, I should gain no new evidence in w, but my future evi-
dence should entail Red in r. In r, I have perfect access to what my evidence entails, and
have no evidence that suggests that I am incapable of assessing my evidence correctly.
21For seminal discussion of cases of defeat involving these two kinds of higher-order evidence, see
Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) and Christensen (2010).
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Thus, according to a suitably qualified version of the Entailment-Support Principle, my
evidence should conclusively support Red in r. So, my posterior credence in Red in r
should be 1. In w, if I retain my prior credence in Red, my updating plan will be sub-
ject to an invariant diachronic Dutch book (according to Proposition 6). If I increase my
credence in Red in w, my updating plan will be biased in favour of Red, and therefore
will not be reflective. So, again, it will be subject to an invariant diachronic Dutch book
(according to Proposition 2). What’s the way out?
I can avoid an invariant Dutch book in this case by decreasing my credence in Red
in w. A meta-conditionalizing plan will give me precisely this advice. If I comply with
a meta-conditionalizing plan, I will not be conditionalizing on W in w, but rather on
[E = W], which is just the singleton set  Red containing w. But if I conditionalize on
 Red, my prior credence in Red will drop to 0 even though I gain no new evidence
against Red in w.
This seems quite strange. This implies: in cases of this sort, the only updating
plans that are immune from invariant diachronic Dutch books are ones that require the
relevant agent to change her credences even though her evidence does not change as a
result of her inquiry. This violates:
The Fixity Principle. If an updating plan is epistemically rational for an agent
to adopt before an inquiry, then it does not require her to change her cre-
dences as a result of that inquiry unless her posterior evidence is different
from her prior evidence.
The Fixity Principle seems quite plausible.
However, one could argue that Fixity Principle does not hold in cases where an
agent’s epistemic standards, i.e., her standards for weighing evidence, change with-
out any change in her evidence.22 To adapt an example from Cohen (2000), I may be
rationally certain that, if I go on to study philosophy at Harvard, my epistemic stan-
dards for assessing certain pieces of philosophical evidence—e.g., intuitions that sup-
port the analytic-synthetic distinction— will change even though all the relevant evi-
dence I have on the matter will not. In a slightly idealized version of such a scenario,
I may rationally adopt an updating plan that allows me to assign a different posterior
credence to the proposition that there is a genuine analytic-synthetic distinction even
though my overall evidence does not change. Even if this is true, this does not affect
our argument about Red Wall. There is no reason for us to think that, in that scenario,
my epistemic standards change after I enter the room and look at the wall. So, reject-
ing the Fixity Principle will not help here. As long as a qualified version of the Fixity
Principle is true, we will be able to run a version of our argument once more.
22Such a view will follow from a form of intrapersonal permissivism, i.e., the view that it is rationally
permissible for an agent to assign different credences to the same proposition relative to the same body
of evidence (at different times). For discussion of the notion of epistemic standards, see White (2005),
Schoenfield (2014), and Kopec and Titelbaum (2019).
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A different strategy of rejecting this argument will be to say that I gain some evi-
dence about the colour of the wall when I enter the room in w. This seems implausible.
Even before entering the room, I may know how the wall will look to me when I enter
the room, e.g., by watching a video captured by someone who entered the room just
before me. So, when I enter the room and the wall looks exactly that way to me, I pre-
sumably shouldn’t get any new evidence about the appearance of the wall. Moreover,
if the wall isn’t in fact red but only lit up with trick red light, then it’s unclear how I
could get any new evidence about the colour of the wall in this case.23
There is a more general lesson. If suitably qualified versions of the Entailment-
Support Principle and the Fixity Principle are true, then any updating plan that is rational
for us to adopt in cases like Red Wall will be subject to an invariant diachronic Dutch
book. Therefore, anyone who wishes to justify or vindicate updating plans by appeal-
ing to diachronic Dutch books must reject plausible principles about evidential support
or epistemic rationality.
8 Conclusion
DDBAs are motivated by principles like Exploitability. These are motivated by instru-
mentalism, i.e., the view that we can justify or vindicate norms of epistemic rationality
by appealing to principles of instrumental rationality. The upshot of my argument is
this. Given the tension amongst Invariant Exploitability, Evidence Externalism, and Plan
Conditionalization, the defenders of DDBAs must reject either Evidence Externalism or
Plan Conditionalization. If they reject Evidence Externalism, it is not obvious that they
can block external world scepticism or diachronic Dutch books from arising for condi-
tionalizing plans. If they reject Plan Conditionalization, then they are forced to violate
plausible principles about evidential support or epistemic rationality. So, we cannot
rely on DDBAs for the purpose of justifying or vindicating updating plans.
This argument generalizes. Using the results proved by Schoenfield (2017), we can
show that there is a similar tension amongst Evidence Externalism, Plan Conditionaliza-
tion, and the principle that an agent is rational to adopt only those updating plans
23Another strategymight be to say that, on entering the room, I gain self-locating information about where
I am and what time it is, i.e., information that is not about impersonal or objective subject-matters like the
colour of the wall or its appearance. For defences of the possibility of such self-locating information, see
Lewis (1979) and Perry (1979). For example, on entering the room, I may learn that I am now here in
the room. But it is unclear why that kind of self-locating information should boost my credence against
a non-self-locating proposition about the colour of the wall, i.e., the proposition that the wall is red at
that specific time. While there are other cases where such self-locating information seems to rationally
impact credences about non-self-locating propositions, this happens (at least one diagnosis) because, in
such cases, the agent loses track of who she is or where she is or what time it is. The Sleeping Beauty
puzzle is the best example of this phenomenon; for the example, see Elga (2000). Halpern (2006) offers
the diagnosis that, in cases like this, rational changes in the agent’s doxastic attitudes towards non-self-
locating propositions are due to what he calls asynchrony, i.e., the agent’s having imperfect information
about what time it is. Importantly for us, nothing of this sort happens here. Therefore, someone who
adopts this strategy owes us an explanation of why I should adopt an updating plan that recommends
changing my credences in Red and  Red in response to apparently irrelevant self-locating information.
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which maximize expected accuracy. The same arguments that I have given here would
show that this tension cannot be easily resolved by rejecting either Evidence External-
ism or Plan Conditionalization. This should not only cast doubt on accuracy-based ar-
guments for norms governing updating plans, but also give us reason to be sceptical
about instrumentalist defences of updating plans.
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let hW, Ei be any inquiry and p be any rational prior credence
function defined on subsets of W. Let U be a probabilistic updating plan defined on
that inquiry. We want to show that the following claims are equivalent.
• U is transparent and reflective to p.
• U is a meta-conditionalizing plan relative to p.
This proof is divided into two parts.
First, we want to show that, if U is a meta-conditionalizing plan, then U is both
reflective and transparent. Suppose U is a meta-conditionalzing plan. Let the set of
the strongest pieces of evidence that an agent could get be E = fE1, E2, ..., Ekg. So, for
any Ei, Ui = p(.j[E = Ei]) is the credence function that U recommends relative to Ei.
So, U is transparent. Moreover, by the law of total probability, for any proposition P,
p(P) = å
Ei2E
p(Pj[E = Ei])p([E = Ei]). This means that U is reflective.
Next, we want to show that, if U is both reflective and transparent, then U is a
meta-conditionalizing plan. Suppose that U is both transparent and reflective. Since U
is reflective, there exists a probability function p, such that, for any Em 2 E ,
p([E = Em]) =
k
å
i=1
Ui([E = Em])p([E = Ei]).
Since U is transparent, Ui([E = Em) = 1 if i = m; otherwise, Ui([E = Em]) = 0.
Therefore,
p([E = Em]) = p([E = Em]).
This implies that, for any proposition P,
p(P \ [E = Em]) =
k
å
i=1
Ui(P \ [E = Em])p([E = Ei]).
Since U is transparent and probabilistic, for any i, if i 6= m, Ui(P \ [E = Em]) = 0.
Moreover, for any i, if i = m, Ui(P \ [E = Em]) = Um(P). So, we have:
p(P \ [E = Em]) = Um(P)p([E = Em]).
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This just means that U is a meta-conditionalizing plan. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let hW, Ei be any inquiry and p be any rational prior credence
function defined on subsets of W. Let U be a probabilistic updating plan defined on
that inquiry. We want to show:
• If U is not transparent, then U is subject to a variant diachronic Dutch book.
• If U is not reflective relative to p, then U is subject to an invariant diachronic
Dutch book.
• If U is transparent and reflective relative to p, then U is not subject to a variant
diachronic Dutch book.
This proof is divided into three parts.
Part 1. First, we shall show that, if U is not transparent, then it is subject to a variant
diachronic Dutch book. IfU is not transparent, then there is some evidence-proposition
Ei (i.e., one of the outputs of E) such that the credence function recommended by U
relative to Ei—call it Ui—assigns a credence of less than 1 to [E = Ei], i.e., Ui([E =
Ei]) < 1. Since Ui is a probability function, Ui( [E = Ei]) > 0.
We can construct three books: B, B[E=Ei ], and B[E=Ei ]. The payoffs of these books
are given in Table 4.
[E = Ei]  [E = Ei]
B 1+Ui( [E = Ei]) 1
B[E=Ei ] -1 0
B[E=Ei ] 0 0
Table 4: Payoffs of B, B[E=Ei ], and B[E=Ei ].
First, B is sold to the relevant agent before she gathers evidence at the maximum price
of:
price(B, p)
= p(E = Ei])(1+Ui( [E = Ei])) + p( E = Ei])
= 1+ p(E = Ei])Ui( [E = Ei]).
Second, B[E=Ei ] is sold to the agent after she has gained Ei as her evidence at the max-
imum price of price(B[E=Ei ],Ui) = Ui([E = Ei])  ( 1) =  Ui([E = Ei]). Finally,
when the agent gains any evidence-proposition Ej as her future evidence such that
i 6= j, B[E=Ei ] is sold to her at the maximum price of price(B[E=Ei ],Uj) = 0.
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In any [E = Ei]-world w, the net profit is:
profit(B, p,w) + profit(B[E=Ei ],Ui,w)
= payoff(B,w)  price(B, p)
+ payoff(B[E=Ei ],w)  price(B[E=Ei ],Ui)
= (1+Ui( [E = Ei])  1  p(E = Ei])Ui( [E = Ei]))
+ ( 1+Ui(E = Ei]))
=  p(E = Ei])Ui( [E = Ei])
< 0.
In any  [E = Ei]-world w, where the evidence that the agent gains is Ej, the net profit
is:
profit(B, p,w) + profit(B[E=Ei ],Uj,w)
= payoff(B,w)  price(B, p)
+ payoff(B[E=Ei ],w)  price(B[E=Ei ],Uj)
= (1  1  p(E = Ei])Ui( [E = Ei]))
+ (0  0)
=  p(E = Ei])Ui( [E = Ei])
< 0.
So, in either case, the agent loses some amount of utility.
Part 2. Next, we show that, if U is not reflective, then it is subject to an invariant
diachronic Dutch book.24 Since there are n worlds in W (for some finite n), we can
represent each world wj inW as an n-dimensional vector, with 1 at the j-th place and 0s
elsewhere. Similarly, the prior credence function p as well as eachUi can be represented
as a n-dimensional vector, such that the j-th place is occupied by the value that p or the
relevant Ui assigns to wj. Since U is probabilistic but not reflective, then p does not lie
in the convex hull of the Ui’s. By a well-known Hyperplane Separation Theorem, we
can now show that there is an n-dimensional vector B such that B  (Ui   p) < 0 for
any Ui.25 Let the vector B be a book defined on the finest partition on W, where the
24A similar proof strategy is used by Paris (2001), Williams (2012), and especially Pettigrew (2020,
A 8
).
25Here’s a proof of the relevant theorem. Let the convex hull of the Ui’s be X = fU1,U2, ...,Ukg+. Since
X is closed convex set, there is a unique point a such that a is a point in X that is uniquely closest to p and
a 6= p. Let b = 1
2
(p+ a) and let H be the plane of vectors y such that (y  b)  (p  a) = 0. But then X
cannot intersect H: if it did, say, at c, then there would be a point d which would be on the line between
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value that occupies the j-th place of the vector is the stake of B on fwjg. Then, we can
construct another book B such that for any wj 2 W, B(wj) =  B(wj). So, for any
w 2 W where E(w) = Ei,
profit(B, p,w) + profit(B,Ui,w)
= (B(w)  å
wj2W
p(wj)B(wj)) + (B(w)  å
wj2W
Ui(wj)B(wj))
= (B(w)  å
wj2W
p(wj)B(wj)) + ( B(w)  å
wj2W
Ui(wj)( B(wj)))
= å
wj2W
B(wj)(Ui(wj)  p(wj))
= B  (Ui   p)
< 0.
Therefore, U is subject to an invariant diachronic Dutch book.
Part 3. Finally, we want to show that, ifU is transparent and reflective, then it is not
subject to a diachronic Dutch book. Suppose, for reductio, U is subject to a diachronic
Dutch book. If it is both transparent and reflective, then (by Proposition 1) it is a meta-
conditionalizing plan. Since U is subject to a (variant or invariant) diachronic Dutch
book, we know that there exist books B, B1, ..., Bk defined on a set of propositions, such
that, for any w 2 W, if E(w) = Ei, profit(B, p,w) + profit(Bi,U(w),w) < 0. We
show that, if this is so, then p is subject to a synchronic Dutch book B, i.e., buying B
at maximum price relative to p results in sure loss of utility.
For any w 2 W, if Ei is the evidence-proposition that the agent gets in w, let Bi =
Bw. So, we define the payoff of B as follows.
payoff(B,w) = payoff(B,w) + payoff(Bw,w)  price(Bw,U(w)).
c and a in Y and which would be closer to p than a. So, X must lie entirely on the opposite side of H
from p. This would mean that, for any Ui, p  (b  p) < 0 < Ui  (b  p). This, in turn, would imply that
(Ui   p)  (p  b) < 0.
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We can show the maximum price of B relative to p is:
price(B, p) = å
w2W
p(w)payoff(B(w))
= å
w2W
p(w)[payoff(B,w) + payoff(Bw,w)  price(Bw,U(w))]
= å
w2W
p(w)payoff(B,w) + å
w2W
p(w)payoff(Bw,w)
  å
w2W
p(w)price(Bw,U(w))
= price(B, p) + å
w2W
p(w)payoff(Bw,w)
  å
w2W
p(w) å
w2W
p(wj[E = E(w)])payoff(Bw,w)
= price(B, p) + å
w2W
p(w)payoff(Bw,w)
  å
w2W
p(w) å
w2[E=E(w)]
p(wj[E = E(w)])payoff(Bw,w)
= price(B, p) + å
w2W
p(w)payoff(Bw,w)  å
w2W
p(w)payoff(Bw,w)
= price(B, p).
This means that, for any w,
profit(B, p,w), = payoff(B,w)  price(B, p)
= payoff(B,w) + payoff(Bw,w)  price(Bw,U(w))  price(B, p)
= profit(B, p,w) + profit(Bw,U(w),w)
< 0.
But this cannot be the case. For, according to the converse Dutch book theorem for
probabilism, a probability function cannot be subject to a synchronic Dutch book. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3. Relative to an inquiry hW, Ei, let E = fE(w) : w 2 Wg be the set
of all the strongest pieces of evidence that an agent could gain. We need to prove two
conditionals:
Claim 1. hW, Ei is reflexive iff, for any proposition P 2 E , [E = P]  P.
Claim 2. hW, Ei is transitive and euclidean iff, for any proposition P 2 E
such that P  [E = P].
First, we prove Claim 1. Suppose hW, Ei is reflexive. Then, for any w 2 W, w 2 E(w).
Therefore, [E = E(w)]  E(w). Now, suppose hW, Ei is not reflexive. Then, for some
w 2 W, w /2 E(w). But then, it is not the case that [E = E(w)]  E(w).
Now, we prove Claim 2. Suppose hW, Ei is transitive and euclidean. For reductio,
suppose, for some w 2 W, it is not the case that E(w)  [E = E(w)]. So, there is some
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w 2 E(w), E(w) 6= E(w). This can happen in two ways: either there exists some w
in E(w) such that w /2 E(w), or there exists some w in E(w) such that w /2 E(w).
The first possibility is ruled out by euclideanness, while the second possibility is ruled
out by transitivity. Therefore, for any w 2 W, E(w)  [E = E(w)]. Now, suppose
hW, Ei is either not transitive or not euclidean. If it is not transitive, then there exist
two worlds w,w, such that w 2 E(w) but it is not the case that E(w)  E(w). So, it is
not the case that E(w)  [E = E(w)]. If it is not euclidean, there exists a world w 2 W
such that, for some worlds w,w 2 E(w), w /2 E(w); in that case, E(w) 6= E(w).
So, it is not the case that E(w)  [E = E(w)]. QED.
Proof of Proposition 4. For any serial, transitive, and euclidean inquiry hW, Ei, let U be a
conditionalizing plan defined on that inquiry relative to any rational prior p. Then, the
following two claims are equivalent.
• hW, Ei is reflexive.
• U is reflective relative to p.
Suppose an inquiry hW, Ei is serial, transitive and euclidean.
First, we show that, if hW, Ei is reflexive, then there exists no prior credence func-
tion p such that any conditionalizing plan U based on p is non-reflective. Suppose
E1, E2, ..., Ek are the strongest pieces of posterior evidence that the agent could get as
a result of her inquiry. If hW, Ei is reflexive, transitive and euclidean, then, for any i
between 1 and k (inclusive), Ei = [E = Ei] (by Proposition 3). In that case, any condi-
tionalizing plan U based on p is also a meta-conditionalizing plan. From Proposition 1,
we know that meta-conditionalizing plans are reflective.
Second, we show that, if hW, Ei is not reflexive, then, for any regular probability
function p, any conditionalizing plan U based on p is non-reflective. Since hW, Ei is
not reflexive, there exists a world w 2 W such that w /2 E(w). Either there is a world
w 2 W such that w 2 E(w), or there is not. Suppose there is such a world w. Now,
by seriality, let w be a world such that w 2 E(w). So, by transitivity, w 2 E(w).
But then, since w 2 E(w) and w 2 E(w), w 2 E(w) by euclideanness. Again,
since w 2 E(w) and w 2 E(w), by transitivity w 2 E(w). But this contradicts our
earlier assumption. Therefore, there is no world w 2 W such that w 2 E(w). If this
is correct, then, for any E(w), p( fwgjE(w)) = 1. Since p is regular, p( fwg) < 1.
Since U is a conditionalizing plan based p, then, for any w, U(w) = p(.jE(w)). In
that case, U is not reflective. QED.
Proof of Proposition 5. We want to show that, for any inquiry hW, Ei, if U is a condition-
alizing plan based on a rational regular prior credence function p, the following two
claims are equivalent.
• hW, Ei is transitive and euclidean.
• U is transparent.
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By Claim 2 in the proof of Proposition 3, we know that an inquiry is both euclidean and
transitive iff, for any w 2 W, E(w)  [E = E(w)]. Suppose hW, Ei is transitive and
euclidean. Then, for any w 2 W, if c = U(w), c([E = E(w)]) = p([E = E(w)]jE(w)) =
1. So, U is transparent. Now, suppose hW, Ei is not euclidean and transitive. So, for
some w 2 W, it is not the case that E(w)  [E = E(w)]. Since p is regular, p([E =
E(w)]jE(w)) < 1. Thus, U will not be transparent. QED.
Proof of Proposition 6. We want to show that, for any reflexive and transitive inquiry
hW, Ei, if U is a conditionalizing plan defined on hW, Ei based on a rational prior cre-
dence function p, the following two claims are equivalent.
• hW, Ei is euclidean.
• U is not subject to an invariant diachronic Dutch book.
If hW, Ei is reflexive, transitive and euclidean, then, by Proposition 3, for any w 2 W,
E(w) = [E = E(w)]. In that case, any conditionalizing plan U based on a regular
prior credence function pwill also be a meta-conditionalizing plan. From Proposition 2,
we know that such plans aren’t subject to diachronic Dutch books. So, all we need to
prove here is that, if hW, Ei is reflexive and transitive but not euclidean, U is subject to
an invariant diachronic Dutch book.
If hW, Ei is reflexive and transitive, but not euclidean, then there exist two worlds
in x, y 2 W, such that x 2 E(y) but y /2 E(x).26 Now, given the finiteness ofW, there is
also a world z 2 W, such that y 2 E(z), but there is no world w such that E(z)  E(w).
Note two things. First of all, x 2 E(z), but z /2 E(x). For, if that were so, then, by
transitivity, y would be in E(x). So, p( [E = E(z)]jE(z)) > 0. Second, for any world
w, if E(w) 6= E(z), there is no world w 2 E(w) such that E(w) = E(z). For, if that
were the case, then, by transitivity, E(z) would be a subset of E(w). But, since it is not
the case that E(z)  E(w), E(w) would have to be E(z). So, we get the result that,
for any w 2 W, if E(w) 6= E(z), then E(w)  [E = E(z)]. In that case, p( [E =
E(z)]jE(w)) = 1.
We construct two books Bold and B

new such that Bold is sold to the relevant agent
before the inquiry atmaximumprice, and Bnew sold to her after the inquiry atmaximum
price. The payoffs of these books are given in Table 5.
[E = E(z)]  [E = E(z)]
Bold 1+ p( [E = E(z)]jE(z)) 1
Bnew -1 0
Table 5: Payoffs of Bold and B

new
26Why is this true? Since hW, Ei is not euclidean, there exist three worlds x, y,w, such that w 2 E(y)
and x 2 E(y), but w /2 E(x). But, in that case, it cannot be the case that y 2 E(x). For, if that were the case,
then, by transitivity, w would be in E(x).
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First, the maximum price that the agent can rationally pay for Bold relative to p is:
price(Bold, p) = p([E = E(z)])(1+ p( [E = E(z)]jE(z))) + p( [E = E(z)])
= 1+ p([E = E(z)])p( [E = E(z)]jE(z)).
Second, in any [E = E(z)]-world w, the agent will buy Bnew at the maximum price of:
price(Bnew, p(.jE(z))) =  1 p([E = E(z)]jE(z)) + 0 p( [E = E(z)]jE(z))
=  p([E = E(z)]jE(z)).
Finally, we know that, for any [E = E(z)]-world w, p( [E = E(z)]jE(w)) = 1. So, in
any world  [E = E(z)]-world w, the maximum price that the agent can pay for Bnew
is:
price(Bnew, p(.jE(w))) =  1 0+ 0 1
= 0.
Therefore, in any [E = E(z)]-world w, the agent’s net profit will be:
profit(Bold, p,w) + profit(B

new, p(.jE(z)),w)
= (payoff(Bold,w)  price(Bold, p))
+ (payoff(Bnew,w)  price(Bnew, p(.jE(z)))
= (1+ p( [E = E(z)]jE(z))  1  p([E = E(z)])p( [E = E(z)]jE(z)))
+ ( 1+ p([E = E(z)]jE(z)))
=  p([E = E(z)])p( [E = E(z)]jE(z))
< 0.
And, in any  [E = E(z)]-world w, the agent’s net profit will be:
profit(Bold, p,w) + profit(B

new, p(.jE(w))),w)
= (payoff(Bold,w)  price(Bold, p))
+ (payoff(Bnew,w)  price(Bnew, p(.jE(w)))
= (1  1  p([E = E(z)])p( [E = E(z)]jE(z)))
+ (0  0)
=  p([E = E(z)])p( [E = E(z)]jE(z))
< 0.
Thus, the net profit is negative in both cases. QED.27
27For comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I am grateful to Arif Ahmed, Tim Button, Julien Dutant,
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